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CHRISTOPHER ROBERTSON? 
Scholars, advocates, and courts have begun to recognize a First 
Amendment right for the makers of drugs and medical devices to 
promote their products “off-label,” without proving safety and efficacy 
of new intended uses. Yet, so far, this debate has occurred in a vacuum 
of peculiar cases, where convoluted commercial speech doctrine 
underdetermines the outcome. Juxtaposing these cases against other 
routine prosecutions of those who peddle unapproved drugs reveals the 
common legal regime at issue. Review of the seven arguments deployed 
in the off-label domain finds that, if they were valid, they would 
undermine the FDA’s entire premarket approval regime. Even more, a 
companion paper shows that, if valid, this First Amendment logic would 
undermine a wide range of statutory regimes that have similar intent-
based structures and that rely on speech as evidence of intent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike other regulatory systems, the Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics Act 
(FDCA) requires that prior to selling any drug or device intended to treat a 
disease, the seller must prove to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) that 
it is in fact safe and effective.1 If a company nonetheless sells such a drug or 
device without the FDA’s approval and labeling, it commits a crime.2  
By putting the burden of proof on drugmakers and device makers who can 
reap the profits from proven uses, this regulatory regime produces knowledge, 
which was not produced in the unregulated market that preceded it.3 With this 
science, physicians help patients make intelligent consumption decisions, and 
drug and device makers compete on proven quality rather than on hype. When 
this information is produced and released it creates a market whereby 
physicians, patients, and payors can evaluate whether a product is worth its 
price.  
Some still debate whether this policy strikes the right balance to maximize 
aggregate social welfare.4 The cost of such a premarket approval regime is in 
the several years in which suffering and dying patients are generally unable to 
access drugs that may or may not someday be proven safe and effective.5 The 
                                                                                                                     
 1 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)–(b)(1)(A), (d), 360e(c)(1); see also Christopher Robertson, 
Essay, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The Regulation of Drug Promotion Under an 
Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 545, 547–55 (2014) (reviewing this statutory 
regime). 
 2 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)–(d) (2012); see also id. § 333 (specifying felonies and 
misdemeanors); id. § 352 (defining “misbranding” and labeling requirements). Directions 
for use may be inadequate if “[s]tatements of all . . . uses for which such drug is intended” 
are omitted. 21 C.F.R. § 201.5(a)–(b) (2016); see also id. § 201.128 (referring to “the 
objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of drugs” and outlining 
the evidence that can show such intent).  
 3 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 79 (2d ed. 1988) 
(explaining that because information is a non-rivalrous and non-excludable public good, it 
can be expected to be insufficiently produced without regulatory intervention). 
 4 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Voluntary Organizations 
Should Regulate the Use of Cancer Drugs, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1, 20 (2009). 
 5 Some patients may receive unapproved drugs through an “expanded access” 
program, through which the FDA quickly approves the vast majority of applications. 
Jonathan J. Darrow et al., Practical, Legal, and Ethical Issues in Expanded Access to 
Investigational Drugs, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 279, 279–80 (2015); see also 21 C.F.R. 
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benefit is a collective determination of which drugs really are safe and 
effective.6 The size of these costs and benefits is an empirical question, which 
must be compared against a counterfactual world in which patients would have 
broader access to drugs, but physicians and patients would have less information 
about their safety and efficacy.7  
Legally, this regime focuses on the drugmaker and its intentions for its own 
product sold in interstate commerce. In contrast, federal law vests physicians 
and patients with broad discretion over the practice and consumption of 
medicine, understood historically as a primarily local behavior.8 In fact, 
physicians often prescribe drugs for “off-label” uses, beyond those approved by 
the FDA;9 in some clinical settings, virtually every prescription is written for an 
off-label use.10  
Still, if a company intends to sell its product for these new uses too, the FDA 
requires that the company submit an application to change the label to reflect 
those intentions, supported by the same sorts of proof that the drug is in fact safe 
and effective for this new intended use.11 Otherwise, the drug would be 
misbranded, failing to provide appropriate labeling for all intended uses.12 This 
“intended uses” principle has reigned for decades.13 The FDA does not really 
                                                                                                                     
§ 312.300 (2016) (describing the limitations surrounding expanded access, aka 
“compassionate use”). 
 6 See generally Darrow et al., supra note 5, at 279–82 (describing the various actors 
involved in assessing the safety and efficacy of experimental drugs). 
 7 See David C. Radley et al., Off-Label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 
166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021, 1021 (2006) (describing the dangers of off-label drug 
uses). 
 8 See 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or 
interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or administer any legally 
marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a legitimate health care 
practitioner-patient relationship.”). 
 9 Radley et al. supra note 7, at 1021; Randall S. Stafford, Perspective, Regulating Off-
Label Drug Use—Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427 (2008). 
 10 See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for 
Heightened Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 476 
(2009) (“An off-label use may provide the best available intervention for a patient, as well 
as the standard of care for a particular health problem. In oncology, pediatrics, geriatrics, 
obstetrics, and other practice areas, patient care could not proceed without off-label 
prescribing.” (citations omitted)). 
 11 21 U.S.C. §§ 352, 355(a)–(b)(1)(A); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 128, 201.5(a)–(b) (2016). 
 12 Nathan Cortez, The Statutory Case Against Off-Label Promotion, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 
ONLINE 124, 130–31 (2016); see also supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 13 See, e.g., Alberty Food Prods. Co. v. United States, 185 F.2d 321, 325–26 (9th Cir. 
1950) (holding that a drug product was misbranded because its labeling failed to state the 
intended use of the drug as suggested by the company in newspaper advertisements).  
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approve drugs; it approves uses for drugs, one-by-one.14 In fact, roughly half of 
the applications submitted to the FDA are to seek approval for such new uses of 
old drugs, essentially bringing off-label uses on-label.15 In this way, the FDCA 
forces a drugmaker to internalize the cost of scientifically investigating the 
safety and efficacy of its own product insofar as the drugmaker intends to 
expropriate additional value from its product.  
As the premarket approval policy is applied to new uses of approved drugs, 
the social welfare analysis is different, since patients can very easily access 
drugs “off-label,” even without FDA-approval. So, the welfare cost of the law 
is merely that physicians must rely on peer-reviewed articles and anecdotes from 
other physicians to learn about new uses, rather than on company promotional 
efforts. Physicians may adopt new uses more slowly than they otherwise would, 
but the effects are mixed since many of the new uses will turn out to be unhelpful 
or even deleterious on net. The welfare benefit of the policy is also attenuated 
in this domain, but the function remains the same as in the premarket approval 
process for new uses: the production of rigorous scientific knowledge about 
safety and efficacy, which helps physicians know which new uses to adopt.  
The complicated welfare analysis is precisely the sort of policy question 
with which democratically-accountable legislatures and expert agencies must 
wrestle. Notably, Congress has already made the approval system more complex 
and flexible, with a range of statutory mechanisms that accelerate the 
availability of welfare-enhancing products to patients.16 And even prior to 
approval, the FDA has a fast and permissive mechanism, the expanded access 
exception, that allows patients to access promising drugs.17 There are various 
other tweaks that could be made to the policy that could advance or harm 
aggregate welfare. For example, one could raise or lower the level of evidence 
that the FDA requires to approve an indication, less often or more often allowing 
it to approve indications without randomized, controlled trials.18 Or, one could 
                                                                                                                     
 14 See Sigma-Tau Pharm., Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 145 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(discussing the Orphan Drug Act amendments to the FDCA, explaining the words “for such 
disease or condition” suggests Congress intended to make section 360cc a “disease-specific, 
not drug-specific”); Spectrum Pharm., Inc. v. Burwell, 824 F.3d 1062, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(citing Sigma-Tau Pharm., 288 F.3d at 145).  
 15 See Bo Wang & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Characteristics of Efficacy Evidence 
Supporting Approval of Supplemental Indications for Prescription Drugs in United States, 
2005–14: Systematic Review, 351 BMJ 1–2 (2015), http://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/351/ 
bmj.h4679.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/ATQ5-BCJU] (“In 2014 the FDA approved 40 new 
supplemental indications for already marketed drugs, compared with original approvals of 
44 novel small molecule and biologic agents during the same period.”). 
 16 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 356(a)–(c) (describing expedited approval for “breakthrough 
therapies” and “fast track drugs” to treat “serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions”); 
id. § 356-1 (describing “priority review” process for drugs expected to treat currently 
neglected or untreatable diseases). 
 17 21 C.F.R. § 312.300 (2016); see also Darrow et al., supra note 5, at 279–80.  
 18 See e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 13 (questioning the value of clinical trials).  
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try to increase funding for the FDA to more quickly and/or more rigorously 
review applications submitted for new indications, building on the astounding 
progress already made in this regard.19  
A few prominent scholars and advocates—and recently even some courts—
have begun to recognize a First Amendment right for drugmakers to promote 
their products off-label, without proving safety and efficacy for the new use as 
the FDCA requires.20 Constitutionalization of this question threatens to short-
circuit the welfare debate. The Supreme Court has not yet resolved the question, 
but if it takes an off-label drug marketing case and embraces this same 
percolating First Amendment logic, it would allow a drugmaker to get FDA 
approval for any one use that it chose, but then promote the drug for every other 
use, even where safety and efficacy are unknown.21  
The arc of constitutional history seems to be bending in this direction. There 
was a time when commercial speech, especially that proposing sale of a product, 
was not thought to receive First Amendment protection at all.22 In a landmark 
1976 case, the Court found a right to advertise pharmaceutical drug prices.23 In 
the 1980 Central Hudson case, the Court’s doctrine solidified as it asked 
whether a commercial speech regulation “directly advances” a “substantial 
interest,” with means “not more extensive than necessary.”24 In recent years, the 
                                                                                                                     
 19 See Cassie Frank et al., Era of Faster FDA Drug Approval Has also Seen Increased 
Black-Box Warnings and Market Withdrawals, 33 HEALTH AFF. 1453, 1454, 1456 (2014) 
(documenting the false positives associated with faster review times resulting from prior 
legislation); John K. Jenkins, Director, FDA Office of New Drugs, Presentation at the 
FDA/CMS Summit: CDER New Drug Review: 2016 Update 20 (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacc
o/cder/ucm533192.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT33-MZMF] (showing that median review times 
have been cut from over nineteen months to 7.8 months). 
 20 See infra Part II for case examples and scholarly arguments limned in Part III infra. 
 21 See, e.g., Ed Silverman, Two Former Device Maker Execs Go on Trial for 
Unauthorized Marketing, STAT (June 6, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016 
/06/06/device-fda-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/CW53-AP7E] (expressing the prosecutors’ 
theory that the company deceived the United States Food and Drug Administration by falsely 
claiming the intended use of a device to deliver saline when they actually intended it to 
deliver medicine). The executives were later convicted. Ed Silverman, Former Execs at J&J 
Division Convicted of Illegally Distributing Devices, STAT (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/07/20/medical-devices-fda-acclarent/ 
[https://perma.cc/SE4H-YJS4]. 
 22 Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REV. 909, 927 
(1992) (“Prior to 1976, . . . the prevailing constitutional doctrine . . . held that all product 
advertising ‘fall[s] outside the pale of First Amendment concern,’ or ‘at least [is] less 
rigorously protected than other forms of speech.’” (quoting Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 
1101 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969))). 
 23 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
770 (1976). 
 24 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); 
see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello, Prospects for Regulation of Off-Label 
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Supreme Court has expanded the reach of the First Amendment in many 
domains—from video games25 and animal-crush videos26 to campaign finance27 
and military honors.28 It has also eroded the line between “core” political speech 
that receives full First Amendment protection and commercial speech.29 
Scholars are now debating whether the First Amendment is, and should be, a 
generalized tool to promote an anti-regulatory agenda.30 
This Symposium Article systematically examines the First Amendment 
arguments for off-label promotion, and situates them in the larger scope of the 
FDCA premarket approval system. Part II juxtaposes recent challenges to the 
government’s authority to regulate drugs promoted for off-label uses against the 
government’s unobjectionable and little-noticed prosecutions of modern 
fraudsters, whose drugs have no FDA-approved indications at all. In both these 
off-label and no-label sorts of cases, the crime is the sale of a product with intent 
that it be used in ways not FDA approved. Yet, courts seem to be finding First 
Amendment rights in the off-label cases, but not in the no-label cases. 
To test this disparity, Part III delves into the seven First Amendment 
arguments raised in the off-label domain to ask whether they apply equally to 
the no-label domain. In doing so, I flesh out the merits of each of these 
arguments, to test their applicability in these domains. For example, there is the 
threshold question of whether the FDA’s premarket approval system is 
                                                                                                                     
Drug Promotion in an Era of Expanding Commercial Speech Protection, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
1539, 1589 (2014) (applying Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566).  
 25 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011). 
 26 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). 
 27 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 28 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012); see also Tim Wu, The Right 
To Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, NEW REPUBLIC 3, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporations-hijacked-first-amendment-
evade-regulation [https://perma.cc/2T6Z-PHFL] (describing this trend).  
 29 Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. 
IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) (providing that the scrutiny of commercial speech 
regulations have “evolved into a strict scrutiny test in all but name”); see, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579–80 (2011); see also Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-
Regulated Firms Ever Be Noncommercial?, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 421 (2011) (exploring 
the core/commercial distinction in the pharmaceutical domain). 
 30 E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION 438 (2014) 
(arguing that economic regulations should receive heightened scrutiny as speech regulations 
appropriately do); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE 
EXPRESSION AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 120–21 (2013) 
(“[O]pposition to commercial speech protection . . . all too often is [] a form of ideological 
hostility to the premises of capitalism and commercialism.”). See generally Jane R. 
Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CAL. L. REV. 335 (2017) 
(reviewing the debate); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 
HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 165–67 (2015) (discussing the use of Adam Smith’s economic 
theories as a rationale in the First Amendment case of Edwards v. District of Columbia, 755 
F.3d 996 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
 
2017] THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG 1025 
regulating speech at all, or whether it is instead regulating the sale of a product 
in interstate commerce (a behavior), where the seller’s speech is mere evidence 
of an illicit intent that the drug be used for an unapproved purpose.31 Since both 
no-label drugs and off-label drugs can otherwise be permissibly sold in interstate 
commerce, in both cases speech functions similarly to reveal a criminal intent, 
which transforms the behavior into something illicit. If it were problematic for 
the law to use speech as evidence of intent, it would seem to undermine the 
entire premarket approval regime. Similarly, for six other arguments asserted to 
support a First Amendment a right to promote off-label, I show that if they were 
valid, they would also support a right to promote no-label. 
A companion article examines laws in a wide range of other domains, from 
banking and bribery to guns and mining, which function similarly to the 
FDCA.32 In all these legal regimes, otherwise-legal behavior becomes criminal 
if done with an illicit intent, often proven by speech.33 That survey suggests a 
broader difficulty for any reading of the First Amendment which creates a right 
to off-label promotion by denying the Government the power to use speech as 
evidence of intent.  
II. RECENT CHALLENGES TO THE FDA’S PREMARKET APPROVAL SYSTEM 
In a landmark 2012 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit invoked the First Amendment to reverse a pharmaceutical sales 
representative’s criminal conviction.34 Although the jury found him guilty of 
conspiracy to sell a misbranded drug in interstate commerce, the defendant, Mr. 
Caronia, argued “that he was convicted for his speech—for promoting an FDA-
approved drug for off-label use.”35 The Second Circuit agreed with that framing 
of the case, and said that it would “avoid constitutional difficulties by adopting 
                                                                                                                     
 31 See infra Part III.A. 
 32 Christopher Robertson & Victor Laurion, Tip of the Iceberg II: How the Intended-
Uses Principle Produces Medical Knowledge and Protects Liberty, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 20–26), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2992668 
[https://perma.cc/EP86-W2VK]. 
 33 See id. 
 34 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2012).  
The Caronia case involved the powerful central nervous system depressant Xyrem (also 
known as the “date rape drug”), which had been approved for two specific indications 
based on randomized controlled trials that proved safety and efficacy in adults. 
Nonetheless, Mr. Caronia claimed that Xyrem was a “very safe drug,” and 
recommended that physicians begin using Xyrem to treat a wide range of other diseases 
for both adults and children, including narcolepsy with cataplexy, excessive daytime 
and fragmented sleep, insomnia, fibromyalgia, periodic leg movement, restless leg, 
Parkinson’s disease, muscular sclerosis, chronic fatigue, and chronic pain. 
Robertson, supra note 1, at 553. 
 35 Caronia, 703 F.3d at 152.  
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a limiting interpretation,”36 which “construe[d] the misbranding provisions of 
the FDCA as not prohibiting and criminalizing the truthful off-label promotion 
of FDA-approved prescription drugs.”37 Although the prosecution raised the 
argument that it was merely using the speech as evidence of an illegal intent, the 
Caronia court dismissed the point out of hand, suggesting that the prosecutors 
had referred to the speech too often to suppose that it was merely evidence of 
intent.38 A powerful dissent challenged the majority’s reasoning as being 
myopic, without an understanding of the larger regulatory regime and First 
Amendment law.39 
Caronia upended decades of pharmaceutical law.40 The FDA sought to 
minimize its impact by avoiding appeals and characterizing the case as limited 
to its facts, in which the prosecutors arguably failed to make clear that the 
salesman’s speech was merely being used as evidence of an illegal intent.41 
Although the Caronia decision purported instead to rewrite the FDCA, many 
other off-label cases settled on terms that seemed to be favorable to the FDA 
even after Caronia.42 
In 2015, another drug maker, Amarin Pharma, invoked Caronia as 
precedent for a preliminary injunction against the FDA in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.43 Amarin’s drug, Vascepa, 
                                                                                                                     
 36 Id. at 162 (quoting Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 406 (2010). 
 37 Id. at 168. 
 38 Id. at 160–61. 
 39 Id. at 169–82 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 40 See, e.g., Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“[T]he First 
Amendment allows ‘the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to 
prove motive or intent.’ . . . Thus it is constitutionally permissible for the FDA to use speech, 
in the form of labeling, to infer intent for purposes of determining that [the plaintiff’s] 
proposed sale of saw palmetto extract would constitute the forbidden sale of an unapproved 
drug.” (quoting Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993))). 
 41 Caronia, 703 F.3d at 161 (“The government never argued in summation or rebuttal 
that the promotion was evidence of intent.”). 
 42 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson & Johnson To Pay More than 
$2.2 Billion To Resolve Criminal and Civil Investigations (Nov. 4, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-pay-more-22-billion-resolve-criminal-
and-civil-investigations [https://perma.cc/GB9X-Z96V]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals Agrees To Pay $490.9 Million for Marketing the 
Prescription Drug Rapamune for Unapproved Uses (July 30, 2013), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/wyeth-pharmaceuticals-agrees-pay-4909-million-marketing-prescription-drug-
rapamune-unapproved [https://perma.cc/G89N-NMXS]. Still, the lower courts have begun 
to split on this question of whether off-label promotion is permitted, although most of that 
litigation does not squarely present the First Amendment issue. See, e.g., Jones v. Medtronic, 
89 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1048 (D. Ariz. 2015) (agreeing with “the majority of courts in this 
Circuit . . . that the FDCA prohibits off-label promotion” but acknowledging a split among 
lower courts). 
 43 Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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had been approved by the FDA in July 2012 for use in treating adults with 
triglyceride levels above 500 mg/dL of blood, but Amarin sought to have the 
drug approved for use more broadly.44 Notwithstanding some scientific support 
for such broader use, the FDA denied Amarin approval.45 The FDA demanded 
evidence not only of a biological response to the drug, but a documented 
reduction in a health outcome, specifically cardiovascular risk.46 In April 2015, 
the FDA issued a letter to Amarin notifying them that the company would need 
to provide such additional evidence before marketing the drug more broadly, 
and that Vascepa, “may be considered to be misbranded under the [FDCA] if it 
is marketed with this change before approval . . . .”47 
Invoking Caronia, Amarin challenged the FDA’s regulations, which 
prohibited them “from making completely truthful and non-misleading 
statements” about the product, as a violation of the First Amendment.48 The 
FDA explained that its entire premarket approval system for drugs and devices, 
created by Congress in 1962, was at risk. The FDA sought to cabin Caronia, 
arguing that the case did not “preclude a misbranding action where the acts to 
promote off-label use consist solely of truthful and non-misleading speech, 
provided that the evidence also shows that the drug had been introduced into 
interstate commerce and that the FDA had not approved it as safe and effective 
for the off-label use.”49 The court rejected the FDA’s arguments, explaining that 
the 1962 FDCA statute predates modern First Amendment case law, which 
protects truthful and non-misleading commercial speech.50 The court again 
conceded that the government may use truthful speech as evidence of intent, but 
like the Caronia court, suggested that the prosecution was too focused on the 
speech itself to exploit that doctrine.51  
In another case brought in the same district court, the FDA had sent Pacira 
Pharmaceuticals a letter reminding them that their drug, Exparel, was only 
approved for treating pain resulting from bunionectomies and 
hemorrhoidectomies and that the company should not promote the drug more 
                                                                                                                     
 44 Id. at 209 (“Amarin has sought approval to market Vascepa for patients with 
triglyceride levels between 200 and 499 mg/dL of blood and who are already on statin 
therapy . .?. .”). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 211. 
 47 Id. at 212. See generally Spencer Phillips Hey & Aaron S. Kesselheim, An 
Uninformative Truth: The Logic of Amarin’s Off-Label Promotion, PLOS MED. (2016), 
http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001978 
[https://perma.cc/SP3K-7QT3] (arguing that even if truthful, the claims were uninformative 
and thus misleading). 
 48 Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 212. 
 49 Id. at 224. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
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broadly.52 Pacira argued that the company had a First Amendment right to 
promote Exparel for unapproved and off-label uses.53 The case quickly settled 
after the trial court decision in Amarin, with the FDA mooting much of the First 
Amendment concerns by agreeing to approve the drug for other post-surgerical 
pain treatment as well.54 After reaching the agreement, the FDA said that the 
revision in Exparel’s labeling was based on previously submitted scientific 
evidence.55  
These off-label promotion cases should be viewed in the light of cases 
where there is no FDA-approved indication at all. Historically, these products 
were known as “snake oils” or “quackery,” but as Daniel Carpenter explains, 
“[s]uch language might imply that the market for such medicines was a trifling 
sideshow to the emergence of medically prescribed pharmaceutical products in 
the economic history of the West. Nothing could be further from the truth.”56 
Up until the time the FDCA was enacted, the market for “patent medicines” 
grew consistently from the colonial era to consume hundreds of millions of 
dollars in annual sales, based on widespread advertising in the leading 
periodicals of the time.57 
An example of such a product was “Hamlin’s Wizard Oil,” which consisted 
of turpentine and other proprietary ingredients, and was promoted to treat a wide 
range of ailments.58 Decades later, another notable example was Amygdalin, a 
naturally-occurring substance used to treat cancer in Mexico and other parts of 
the world. The FDA has declined to approve a partially-synthesized version for 
use in the United States.59 The compound, which contains cyanide, is thus a “no-
label” product, even if it was recommended by some physicians.60  
The phenomenon continues, and continues to be prosecuted, today. For 
example, Conrad LeBeau was convicted in 2015 for introducing into interstate 
                                                                                                                     
 52 Pacira Pharm., Inc. v. U.S. FDA, No. 15 Civ. 7055 (LAK), 2015 WL 9499516, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2015) (stipulation and order of settlement). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at *6; see also Brendan Pierson, Pacira, FDA Reach Agreement on Pain Drug 
Marketing Restrictions, YAHOO NEWS (Dec. 15, 2015), http://news.yahoo.com/pacira-fda-
reach-agreement-pain-drug-marketing-restrictions-050405009--finance.html 
[https://perma.cc/8XEP-VS8Y]. 
 55 Pierson, supra note 54. 
 56 DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 77 (2010). 
 57 Id. 
 58 United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 171 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012) (Livingston, J., 
dissenting).  
 59 See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 548 (1979); Laetrile/Amygdalin 
(PDQ®)–Patient Version, NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/ 
treatment/cam/patient/laetrile-pdq/#link/_28 [https://perma.cc/CML7-ULYC]. 
 60 Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 556 (discussing the lower court’s authorization of laetrile 
“under a doctor’s supervision”). 
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commerce a drug he called “Perfect Colon Formula #1,” which he claimed 
reduced food allergies, although it was not approved by the FDA.61 LeBeau 
invoked Caronia to argue that the FDCA unconstitutionally penalized him for 
speech about the use of a product, but the court rejected that theory, explaining 
that the statute prohibits the introduction of an unapproved drug into interstate 
commerce.62 LeBeau insisted that his claim that Perfect Colon Formula #1 
“reduces food allergies” was neither misleading nor illegal.63 The LeBeau court 
thought it important, however, that LeBeau’s drug had no approved uses at all, 
distinguishing that Mr. Caronia “was not prosecuted for distribution of an 
unapproved new drug. Instead, he had promoted an approved drug for off-label 
use.”64 The trial court seemed to be invoking this as a per se distinction, without 
explicit reasoning. 
In another case, Louis Daniel Smith was convicted in May 2015 for selling 
a product he called “Miracle Mineral Solution” (MMS) as a cure for cancer, 
AIDS, malaria, hepatitis, Lyme disease, asthma, and the common cold.65 Some 
MMS promoters suggested it be swallowed orally or used as an enema to treat 
autism, as well.66 In fact, MMS is a mixture of sodium chlorite,67 an industrial 
chemical used as a pesticide and for hydraulic fracking.68 Once consumers of 
MMS mixed the sodium chlorite with citric acid, as instructed, they had chlorine 
dioxide, an industrial-strength bleach.69 At his trial, Smith argued that the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments protected his business model.70 Although he did 
not specifically raise Caronia (perhaps because he was representing himself pro 
se), Smith contended that because the business had been conducted privately as 
                                                                                                                     
 61 United States v. Lebeau, No. 10-CR-253, 2016 WL 447612, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 3, 
2016). 
 62 Id. at *9. 
 63 Id. at *8. 
 64 Id. at *9. 
 65 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Seller of “Miracle Mineral 
Solution” Convicted for Marketing Toxic Chemical as a Miracle Cure (May 28, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seller-miracle-mineral-solution-convicted-marketing-toxic-
chemical-miracle-cure [https://perma.cc/Z3MN-BP6A]. 
 66 Guy Lynn & Ed Davey, ‘Miracle Autism Cure’ Seller Exposed by BBC Investigation, 
BBC NEWS (June 11, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-33079776 
[https://perma.cc/6L76-6NKE]. The FDA referred to “miracle cures” in a consumer update 
warning of the rise in fraudulent treatments for autism, some of which carried dangerous 
health risks. Autism: Beware of Potentially Dangerous Therapies and Products, U.S. FDA 
(Apr. 25, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm394757.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NG8D-BRUZ]. 
 67 See id. 
 68 Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 65. 
 69 Id. 
 70 See Mark Freeman, ‘Miracle’ Providers Claim Constitutional Protection, MAIL 
TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.mailtribune.com/article/20130220/NEWS/302200322 
[https://perma.cc/UWY5-G3K9].  
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a “First Amendment Private Health Care Association,” the FDCA was not 
applicable.71 That argument failed.72 
These courts have blithely tolerated prosecutions of no-label drug dealers, 
even over First Amendment arguments. In many other cases, the defendant does 
not even raise the claim, or if raised, the claim does not appear in published 
opinions.73 As Robert Post has written in other domains, “[i]t is not that 
regulation of this conduct is affirmatively permitted by the First Amendment; it 
is rather that courts do not even subject such regulation to First Amendment 
scrutiny.”74  
III. THE OFF-LABEL ARGUMENTS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE NO-
LABEL DOMAIN 
The review of recent cases suggests that it is infected by an untheorized 
incoherence. In the “off-label” cases, defendants successfully raise First 
Amendment arguments to avoid prison for promoting drugs for uses not 
approved by the FDA. In another set of “no-label” cases, defendants are being 
sent to prison for promoting drugs for uses not approved by the FDA. In both 
sets of cases, we have promotion for uses not approved by the FDA, but radically 
different outcomes.  
Let us set up a running schema to illustrate the problem. Suppose there is a 
chemical compound, Offixa, which has been FDA approved to treat a condition, 
such as hair loss or macular degeneration. Suppose there is another chemical 
compound, Notixa, that has not been FDA approved for any purpose, but which 
is routinely sold in another domain, for example, as a cleaning product, 
nutritional supplement, or an industrial solvent. On the FDA’s view, if the 
makers of either Offixa or Notixa run ads saying, “my product cures cancer,” 
they express the intent that it be used as such, and commit a crime when they 
then sell their product.  
How does the First Amendment apply in these two domains? Does it require 
that the FDA tolerate promotions for unapproved uses in one domain, but not 
the other? Consider each of the seven arguments asserted for a right to promote 
off-label. 
                                                                                                                     
 71 Id. 
 72 See Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note 65. 
 73 See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 170 F. Supp. 3d 439, 454 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(upholding a conviction for selling misbranded drugs in interstate commerce, relying 
partially on sales fliers, a form of speech). 
 74 Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 
88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2364 (2000). 
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A. The Regulation of Speech  
The most fundamental argument advanced for a First Amendment right to 
promote drugs off-label is that such promotion is a form of speech.75 This theory 
has some facial plausibility, since marketing efforts have for decades been well-
understood to be a protected form of speech, and the Supreme Court has struck 
down speech regulations in the pharmaceutical sector in particular.76 Some have 
argued that commercial speech should receive full First Amendment 
protection.77 Alternatively, some argue that promotional speech is not purely 
commercial, but includes the exchange of information, often to learned 
intermediaries.78 For present purposes, these points can be conceded; the 
question is merely whether the FDA is regulating speech at all in the off-label 
domain and in the no-label domain. 
To the contrary, the FDCA arguably proscribes the conduct of selling a drug 
in interstate commerce with the intent for it to be used in ways that are not FDA 
approved and shown on the label with appropriate instructions for safe use.79 
On this view, prosecutions for violating this crime are not regulations of speech 
at all, since the speech is merely evidence of the drugmaker’s intent to sell a 
product not proven safe and effective through the procedure Congress 
established. As I have explained elsewhere, the intent that a product be used to 
treat a disease is what makes it a drug, and that same predicate then creates the 
duty to prove its safety and efficacy.80  
This regime can be understood as a classic regulation of conduct (actus 
reus), with a mens rea (intent) element. As both the Offixa and Notixa examples 
show, the product may be sold in interstate commerce without this illicit intent 
(intending instead that it be used for an approved purpose or for some other 
                                                                                                                     
 75 See, e.g., supra notes 34–51 for a discussion of Caronia and Amarin. 
 76 E.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 577–78 (2011) (“[T]he State may not 
seek to remove a popular but disfavored product from the marketplace by prohibiting 
truthful, nonmisleading advertisements . . . .”); Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 
357, 374 (2002) (the Court has long “rejected the notion that the Government has an interest 
in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to prevent 
members of the public from making bad decisions with the information”); Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (providing that 
the state could not limit pharmacists’ advertising of drug prices). 
 77 See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 30, at 121. 
 78 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Herbst, Off-Label “Promotion” May Not Be Merely 
Commercial Speech, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 43, 83 (2015) (stating that the speech is a mixture of 
commercial and scientific speech); Joseph J. Leghorn et al., The First Amendment and FDA 
Restrictions on Off-Label Uses: The Call for a New Approach, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 
397 (2008) (“[T]he underlying speech . . . is fully protected scientific speech.”). 
 79 See supra notes 1, 2, 12 and accompanying text. 
 80 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 547; see also 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B)–(C) (2012) 
(incorporating the concept of intent in the definition of “drug”). 
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nondrug purpose altogether), and avoid criminal liability. In such cases, there is 
actus reus (sale) without illicit mens rea (intent for an unapproved use), and thus 
no crime. And likewise, those who speak, encouraging the use of a given drug 
for unapproved purposes, but do not sell it in interstate commerce, face no 
criminal liability. In such cases, there may be a mens rea but no actus reus, and 
thus no crime. The speech, on this theory, is not regulated whatsoever; the 
government regulates only acts with specific intent. The speech simply serves 
as evidence revealing a criminal intent, i.e., that a product be used for an 
unapproved purpose. 
The Supreme Court has said that “[t]he First Amendment . . . does not 
prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to 
prove motive or intent. Evidence of a defendant’s previous declarations or 
statements is commonly admitted in criminal trials subject to evidentiary rules 
dealing with relevancy, reliability, and the like.”81  
After all, we have a specific rule of evidence allowing admission of 
statements of the defendant himself, even if it would be otherwise barred as 
hearsay.82 The Fifth Amendment also reflects this practice.83 The Framers 
recognized that a defendant’s own speech could be used against him; they 
simply provided that such speech could not be compelled.84 It is hard to imagine 
a stronger legal footing for the use of the defendant’s own speech against him.  
As Richard Epstein has explained, “[t]he legal system could not operate if 
the external evidence of these mental states was systematically excluded from 
evidence, which of course it is not.”85 Accordingly, the prosecution of a cocaine 
dealer based on a tapped phone call in which he proposes a sale does not 
implicate the First Amendment.86 Even where there are expressive values at 
stake, such as when a person sends a letter to the government disclosing his 
criminal refusal to sign up for the military draft as required by law, a prosecution 
for the underlying crime does not violate the First Amendment.87 Any impact 
on the First Amendment is “incidental,” and “[t]he First Amendment confers 
                                                                                                                     
 81 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993). For an argument against this 
foundational rule, see Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as 
Free Expression, 76 ALB. L. REV. 697, 698–99 (2012/2013). 
 82 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (stating that “an opposing party’s statement” is excluded 
from hearsay and may be admissible). 
 83 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 84 See generally Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43 (1897) (reviewing British 
and American history on the use of confessions); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461–
62, 467 (1966) (discussing Bram). 
 85 EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 438. See generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, 
AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 6–7 (1989) (reviewing many such crimes that involve 
language). 
 86 See, e.g., United States v. Carneiro, 861 F.2d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 87 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 605, 611 (1985) (applying the O’Brien 
test for the “incidental” regulation of speech).  
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no . . . immunity from prosecution.”88 The companion article documents 
innumerable other instances of speech being used as evidence of a criminal 
intent, making the FDCA’s regime quite routine.89 
In the off-label domain, challengers rejoin to the intent-conduct argument, 
saying that even when they do not promote off-label uses, drugmakers are often 
well aware of off-label uses of their product.90 The challengers use this fact of 
company knowledge to show that the FDA turns a blind eye, and prosecutes 
only when the drugmakers promote. Thus, it is really a speech regulation after 
all. 
To the contrary, the FDCA draws the line at intent for a new use, which is 
a distinct legal standard compared to knowledge or other potential mens rea 
elements Congress could have selected. This is not an uncommon move for 
legislators.91 In patent law, for example, “[m]ere knowledge of possible 
infringement by others does not amount to inducement; specific intent and 
action to induce infringement must be proven.”92 In the FDCA, Congress has a 
rational basis for choosing intent, since in the no-label context it allows use of 
chemicals for valuable nondrug purposes (for example, as industrial solvents or 
food additives), and in the off-label context allows physician discretion in the 
practice of medicine, which is outside the federal ambit. In both cases, the 
FDCA links the costs of scientific investigation to the manufacturer who intends 
to extract value from such medical uses.  
Consider the alternative of using knowledge in the no-label context. In the 
recent case in which industrial bleach was being promoted by scam artists as a 
treatment for autism, discussed above,93 the original chemical manufacturers 
may well have come to know that someone downstream was reselling their 
product for illicit purposes. Yet that knowledge alone is not tantamount to an 
                                                                                                                     
 88 United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 
614).  
 89 See generally Robertson & Laurion, supra note 32. 
 90 See, e.g., United State v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 162 n.9 (2d Cir. 2012) (asking 
rhetorically if mere knowledge would impose liability); Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. 
Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and the First Amendment: A Study in 
the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 343 (2011) (“The 
fact that a manufacturer fails to promote off-label use surely does not imply that it is unaware 
that its product will be used off-label; a drug manufacturer is not an idiot. Indeed, 
reimbursement for specified off-label uses of prescription drugs is well established.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 91 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 
(2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he mens rea standard for aiding and abetting liability in [Alien Tort 
Statute] actions is purpose rather than knowledge alone.”). 
 92 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also 
DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part) 
(providing that the inducement of infringement under Section 271(b) requires a “specific 
intent” to induce another to infringe). 
 93 See Lynn & Davey, supra note 66. 
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intent that it be so used. There are innumerable other examples of products being 
diverted for illicit use—including pseudoephedrine being used to make 
methamphetamine94 and glue being sniffed for a cheap high (aka “huffing”).95 
Prosecuting the chemical manufacturers—who know about but have done 
absolutely nothing to encourage these illicit uses—would be senseless. 
Moreover, if such a prosecution shut down the primary market to these products, 
it would deny access to all the other bona fide users of the chemical.  
Similarly, in the off-label context, the makers of an approved cancer drug 
may well know that it will be used for other purposes, where it may even be the 
standard of care. But that mere knowledge has no causal effect on the world and 
does not implicate the drugmaker any more than it implicates strangers. In 
contrast, intent reflects the drugmaker’s attempt to expand sales into the new 
markets and then take responsibility for those marginal sales and profits. They 
are not mere windfalls, as they would be on a knowledge-based criterion. 
Accordingly, only when a manufacturer demonstrates that it intends to extract 
additional value by promoting their product for this new use, does Congress 
require that it make the investment to investigate scientifically whether it is safe 
and effective for that use.96 The intentional claiming of those marginal sales 
brings with it the responsibility of proving their safety and efficacy. 
Notably, even if the FDCA were rewritten to use knowledge as the predicate 
rather than intent, the exact same speech problem would arise, because it could 
be used as evidence of company knowledge. This argument is a complete red 
herring. 
Accordingly, speech is simply one way that a manufacturer’s intent can be 
evinced.97 A cocaine dealer’s intent to distribute can be shown by the amount 
he is carrying, his patterns of travel, and ultimately his act of making a delivery 
to a customer.98 Similarly, a pharmaceutical drugmaker’s intent for their product 
to be prescribed for psychiatric disorders (regardless of whether it is so 
                                                                                                                     
 94 Legal Requirements for the Sale and Purchase of Drug Products Containing 
Pseudophedrine, Ephedrine, and Phenylpropanolamine, U.S. FDA (Sept. 13, 2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm072423.htm 
[https://perma.cc/E88V-R9N4]. 
 95 Nat’l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Drug Facts: Inhalants, DRUGABUSE.GOV, 1 (Feb. 2017), 
https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/inhalants [https://perma.cc/V6PP-JJD9]. 
 96 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 
18, 32 (1st Cir. 2009); United States ex rel. Bergman v. Abbot Labs. 995 F. Supp. 2d 357, 
361, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2014). But see United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 152, 168 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
 97 See 21 C.F.R. § 201.128 (2016) (“[T]he objective intent of the persons legally 
responsible for the labeling of drugs” may be demonstrated by “oral or written statements by 
such persons or their representatives” and “the circumstances that the article is, with the 
knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and used for a purpose for which 
it is neither labeled nor advertised.”). 
 98 E.g., United States v. Yearwood, 518 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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approved) can be shown by the company hiring psychiatrists in key sales 
positions, by sending drug samples to psychiatrists, by subsidizing the 
psychiatry professional society, by paying kickbacks or other benefits to the 
psychiatrists who use the drug off-label, or by issuing coupons targeted to 
psychiatric patients in order to subsidize their consumption.99 The drugmaker’s 
speech is just one possible mechanism for showing the intended use; it is neither 
necessary nor always sufficient.100 
Still, this may all seem too formalist for the challengers—distinctions 
without differences.101 One must admit that speech plays a very prominent role 
in the typical misbranding prosecution. Accordingly, courts have summarily 
swept aside this theory.102 Some advocates have called it “disingenuous.”103 
Regardless of which side is correct on this point about whether the FDA is 
regulating speech or merely using it as evidence of intent, it should now be clear 
that the argument does not depend on whether the drug has been approved 
previously for a different use (as in off-label prosecutions) or not (as in no-label 
prosecutions). For Notixa, the exact same behavior of shipping in interstate 
commerce becomes criminal if the seller has and expresses an intent that it be 
used to treat an unapproved disease. Then it is a drug subject to FDA 
approval.104 In this way, Notixa and Offixa rise and fall together. If either 
company claims that its product cures cancer, it will be liable for the crime of 
introducing a misbranded drug in interstate commerce. If neither company 
makes such a claim, then they are free to move their product in interstate 
commerce. There is no apparent theory of the First Amendment that would 
allow the FDA to regulate products using speech as evidence of intent in one 
category but not the other. 
                                                                                                                     
 99 See, e.g., Duxbury, 579 F.3d at 18 (rebate program as part of alleged scheme to 
encourage off-label use); Bergman, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 361 (kickbacks as part of an off-label 
marketing scheme).  
 100 See Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. U.S. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
(“A manufacturer that engages in non-communicative activities to promote off-label use 
cannot use the First Amendment as a shield.”). 
 101 See, e.g., Rodney A. Smolla, Off-Label Drug Advertising and the First Amendment, 
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81, 111–12 (2015) (“The so-called ‘conduct’ being regulated is 
expressive conduct?conduct as protected by the First Amendment as moving one’s lips to 
talk.”). 
 102 See, e.g., United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting the 
speech-as-evidence-of-intent doctrine because the prosecutors referred to the off-label 
promotion so often (“over forty times”)); id. at 159 (“Thus, the government’s theory of 
prosecution identified Caronia’s speech alone as the proscribed conduct.”). 
 103 Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 90, at 342–43. 
 104 See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text. 
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B. Potential Truth of Efficacy 
The Supreme Court has long said that commercial speech is unprotected if 
untrue.105 In the off-label context, those who challenge the FDA emphasize that 
a company’s claims about its product may in fact be true, and thus protected.106 
Maybe Offixa does cure cancer. But, maybe Notixa does too. The more 
important question is who should decide in either case? 
I have elsewhere argued a point that should be obvious: we cannot simply 
assume (as courts and advocates have) that claims to off-label efficacy are 
true.107 In fact, most off-label uses lack a strong scientific basis for inferring 
efficacy. In one recent study, the authors reviewed 17,847 off-label uses and 
found that 80.9% of the time, the uses “lacked strong scientific evidence.”108 
This finding is similar to that of an often-cited 2006 national study by another 
team, finding that 73% of off-label uses had little or no scientific support.109 
Thus, quite often, off-label uses lack the scientific basis that the FDA requires 
                                                                                                                     
 105 See Gregory Conko, Hidden Truth: The Perils and Protection of Off-Label Drug and 
Medical Device Promotion, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 149, 151 (2011) (citing cases for the 
proposition that “the First Amendment does not protect false, fraudulent, or even 
unintentionally misleading speech”); see also Kesselheim & Mello, supra note 24, at 1577 
(arguing that off-label promotion can be regulated where untrue). But see Constance E. 
Bagley et al., Snake Oil Salesmen or Purveyors of Knowledge: Off-Label Promotions and 
the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 367 (2013) (it is 
difficult to discern whether commercial speech is truthful). 
 106 See, e.g., Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 90, at 350 (“Government may not attempt 
to manipulate lawful citizen behavior by means of the selective suppression of truthful 
expression advocating lawful activity.”); John E. Osborn, Can I Tell You the Truth? A 
Comparative Perspective on Regulating Off-Label Scientific and Medical Information, 10 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 299, 307 (2010) (“[W]here the challenged off-label 
information is truthful, what is the public interest in forbidding it?”). See generally Stephanie 
M. Greene, Debate, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the First Amendment: FDA Prohibitions 
on Off-Label Marketing Do Not Violate Drug Manufacturers’ First Amendment Rights, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 239, 241–42 (2014) (introducing pharmaceutical manufacturers 
attempting to argue a First Amendment defense based on the fact that information provided 
by manufacturers is “truthful and not misleading”); Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: 
Commercial Free Speech vs. Public Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 
31, 37 (2011) (“[A]lthough the government may protect consumers from false or misleading 
information, it generally may not prohibit truthful and nondeceptive claims in pursuit of 
some other valuable ends.”); Luke Dawson, Note, A Spoonful of Free Speech Helps the 
Medicine Go Down: Off-Label Speech & the First Amendment, 99 IOWA L. REV. 803, 814 
(2014) (finding that speech “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading” (quoting 
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980))). 
 107 See generally Robertson, supra note 1, at 558. 
 108 Tewodros Eguale et al., Association of Off-Label Drug Use and Adverse Drug Events 
in an Adult Population, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 55, 56–58 (2016).  
 109 Radley et al., supra note 7, at 1021. 
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for new uses, on this score making them similar to new uses for unapproved 
drugs. 
Of course, these same studies find that in a minority of cases, the off-label 
uses have a substantial scientific basis, perhaps even strong enough to support 
an inference that efficacy claims are truthful.110 This is just to say that the truth 
of efficacy claims about that new indication is supported by scientific 
investigation of that indication. Its truth has nothing to do with whether the drug 
is approved for some other indication. To be sure, the fact that Offixa was 
approved for hair loss does not make a claim that it cures bladder cancer any 
more or less true than the same claim that Notixa cures bladder cancer. In either 
case, if we are to infer truth of efficacy, someone would have to pay for an 
empirical investigation in front of a competent decision-maker and the burden 
of proof would be important, to weigh whatever evidence exists. In both the off-
label and no-label cases, Congress has specified such a procedure and burden in 
the FDCA.111 So, the epistemological argument—that maybe the efficacy claim 
is in fact true—threatens the entire premarket approval regime, if it threatens at 
all. 
This division of epistemic labor is key. Congress has created an expert 
agency, with a specific process and standard for vetting the truth of claims about 
the safety and efficacy of drugs and devices.112 In some cases, the agency has 
actually rejected a company’s request for a new indication; in most other cases 
the company has declined to even ask, knowing that it cannot meet the agency’s 
rigorous standards of proof. Does the First Amendment require that such truth 
claims be litigated in one branch of government versus another? Does it require 
a particular standard of proof? Arguably, no. As coequal branches, Congress 
and the FDA deserve the judiciary’s deference for making factual 
determinations that would form the predicate for heightened constitutional 
scrutiny.113 Even more, for the task of determining the truth in this highly 
technical domain, the FDA has institutional advantages compared to the 
courts.114 These are heady doctrinal questions for the First Amendment, raising 
                                                                                                                     
 110 Eguale et al., supra note 108, at 58 tbl. 1; Radley, supra note 7, at 1023. 
 111 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)–(b)(1)(A), (d), 360e(c)(1). 
 112 See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Agency Action, 9 ENGAGE 
16, 17 (2008) (“[T]he courts will give very considerable deference to the fact findings of 
administrative agencies. . . . [T]here is no indication that the Court is posed to change the 
scope of review for questions of fact.”); Robertson, supra note 1, at 561 (developing an 
argument about this epistemic purpose of the FDA). 
 113 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28, 34 (2010) (adopting strict 
scrutiny for First Amendment rights, but deferring to the government on empirical questions 
about threats posed by certain groups because of weighty national security interests involved 
and the Court’s relative incapacity to make technical determinations).  
 114 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (“The Court has given state and 
federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and 
scientific uncertainty.” (citing Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974) (“When 
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questions not just about its scope but also about the role of the three branches to 
interpret and enforce its provisions.115 Whatever the answers may be to these 
big questions, they would not seem to differentiate between Offixa and Notixa. 
To be sure, in the off-label context, there may be plausible biology stories 
about why a drug for one indication may work well for another. Yet, the same 
may be true for Notixa’s cancer claim. It may have a plausible biological 
mechanism, may have a similar chemical structure to an approved drug, or may 
be approved in some other country. Both Offixa and Notixa may well be 
plausible candidates for a bladder cancer treatment. But plausibility is different 
than proof through established channels. 
Here again, this logic does not supplant the FDA approval procedure, which 
can and does review data when determining the truth of efficacy claims, for the 
first indication or a subsequent one. The regulation of Offixas and Notixas rise 
and fall together. 
C. Proven Safety  
A third argument for the right to promote off-label asserts that the product 
has already been proven safe by the FDA’s approval of the first labelled 
indication, so the FDA has no real interest in regulating further promotion of the 
product.116 At worst, the product may be ineffective for new indications, but it 
will assuredly be harmless. Why not let companies promote it for new uses? 
                                                                                                                     
Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, 
legislative options must be especially broad . . . .”))); Edward M. Basile & Melanie Gross, 
The First Amendment and Federal Court Deference to the Food and Drug Administration: 
The Times They Are A-Changin’, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 31, 43 (2004) (discussing Thompson 
v. Whitaker, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002), where “the court went beyond its typical 
judicial practice and conducted its own analysis of the scientific data, ultimately substituting 
its interpretation of the data for the agency’s”).  
 115 See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY 
OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 111, 113 (2008) (exploring the “question [that] naturally arises 
[of] whether the Supreme Court ever owes deference to the factual resolves of juries, judges, 
legislatures, or administrative agencies;” describing how in one case, “the parties alternately 
argued that the Court owed deference to the fact-finding of legislatures or trial courts, 
depending on which institution supported its side of the case;” and noting that in that case, 
“[n]either side supplied a coherent explanation for its self-interested empirical 
jurisprudence”). 
 116 See Patricia J. Zettler & Henry T. Greely, The Strange Allure of State “Right-To-
Try” Laws, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1885, 1885 (2014) (discussing “right-to-try” 
legislation motivated by a similar insight). See generally Daniel B. Klein & Alexander 
Tabarrok, Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy Requirements? A 
Critical Analysis of Physicians’ Argumentation for Initial Efficacy Requirements, 67 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 743, 745, 768 (2008) (arguing that FDA’s premarket approval requirement to 
prove efficacy is inconsistent with its tolerance of off-label prescribing, and that the former 
should be eliminated).  
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Arguably, this factor distinguishes off-label use from no-label use, where there 
may have been no evidence of safety. 
Before getting to high theory, the FDA starts by simply challenging the 
premise that a drug’s safety proven for one indication demonstrates safety 
overall.117 Safety is a relative term; the law demands proven safety for the 
intended uses.118 This relativity is because we have much greater tolerance for 
a risky treatment for a terminal disease such as cancer, than for an acne 
treatment. The original, approved label is based precisely on a weighing of the 
risks and benefits of the drug for a given indication, and that balance may be 
completely different when used off-label. Indeed, the typical chemotherapy drug 
is patently unsafe, with onerous side effects including fatigue, pain, diarrhea, 
nausea, blood disorders, and nervous system effects. Other drugs have “black 
box” warnings because they are known to cause death in some populations. 
These nasty drugs are approved as “safe” only because, when used as indicated 
on the label, they have offsetting, proven benefits in the treatment of a specific 
disease.  
Moreover, the FDA-approved indication is for a specific dose and method 
of delivery,119 all of which may be different when taken off-label. As 
toxicologists have recognized for centuries, the difference between a drug and 
a poison is simply the dose.120 A drug approved for 10 milligrams administered 
as a topical cream may be utterly unsafe at 1,000 milligrams administered 
intravenously. In one case where a company promoted Botox as an off-label 
treatment for juvenile cerebral palsy, for example, a court upheld a jury’s 
punitive damages award, finding that:  
[T]he jury could have . . . reasonably concluded that [the company’s] conduct 
was outrageously reprehensible because [the company] promoted the use of 
doses that it knew were risky in order to increase profits. . . . A reasonable jury 
could have felt morally outraged by a corporation’s desire to put its bottom line 
above children’s health, safety, and even lives.121  
To simply presume the safety of off-label uses belies the facts of real cases. 
More systematically, off-label use has been associated with adverse events. 
For example, Dr. Tewodros Eguale and colleagues conducted a cohort study 
across 46,000 patients and found that patients were more likely to suffer adverse 
drug events when using products off-label, and the difference was particularly 
stark when the use lacked a strong scientific basis in the form of a randomized, 
                                                                                                                     
 117 See infra notes 118–25 and accompanying text. 
 118 See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 612–13 (1973). 
 119 21 C.F.R. § 201.5(b), (f) (2016). 
 120 Philippe Grandjean, Paraclesus Revisited: The Dose Concept in a Complex World, 
119 BASIC & CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 126, 126 (2016). 
 121 Drake v. Allergan, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d 562, 577 (D. Vt. 2015).  
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controlled trial.122 No-label drugs also typically lack randomized, controlled 
trials showing safety and efficacy, and off-label drugs can be similarly 
dangerous. Aaron Kesselheim and colleagues conclude that,  
Off-label drug prescribing has led to poor efficacy or harm in many instances 
in recent years, such as the use of nesiritide (Natrecor) for stable congestive 
heart failure, paroxetine (Paxil) for depression in children, antipsychotic drugs 
in elderly patients with dementia, and anti-epileptic medications for certain 
mood disorders. In each of these cases, patients were harmed by unsafe or 
ineffective off-label prescription drug use, which led to litigation. 
Manufacturers’ promotional practices were found to have encouraged these 
off-label uses.123 
Of course, certain off-label usages are in fact perfectly safe. The point here 
is simply that one cannot generally infer safety of a drug for an indication other 
than the one that the FDA reviewed and approved.124 There may be high-quality 
scientific studies showing safety for a particular use, and that will be true 
regardless of whether some other use is already approved. Just as in proof of 
efficacy, we have a legal procedure for an expert agency to make those 
inferences about safety when appropriate.125 
Putting all this aside, assume there is a constitutional right for drug 
companies to promote off-label use, based on the principle that the FDA has 
reviewed and approved the product’s safety. The principle would seem to apply 
to at least some Notixas as well. Analytically, it is true that before any drug 
receives FDA approval, it is an unapproved drug, which cannot be marketed.126 
Indeed, over the lifetime of the FDA, thousands of drugs have passed the Phase 
I clinical trial process, which determines a dosage of the chemical in humans, 
                                                                                                                     
 122 Eguale et al., supra note 108, at 56–58; see also Chester B. Good & Walid F. Gellad, 
Off-Label Drug Use and Adverse Events: Turning Up the Heat on Off-Label Prescribing, 
176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 63, 63–64 (2016) (discussing reports of harm from unapproved 
uses of drugs). 
 123 Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Mandatory Disclaimers on Dietary Supplements Do Not 
Reliably Communicate the Intended Issues, 34 HEALTH AFF. 438, 438 (2015) (citations 
omitted). 
 124 Still, the FDA often considers data testing a drug for one indication as useful in 
assessing its safety for another. See, e.g., Wang & Kesselheim, supra note 15, at 5 (describing 
supplemental approvals for new pediatric indications “based on extrapolation from adult 
studies alone”). 
 125 See supra notes 112–15 for a discussion of judicial deference to agency factual 
determinations. 
 126 See generally Emily C. Feinstein et al., The Ethics of Off-Label Use of FDA-
Approved Products, in OFF-LABEL COMMUNICATIONS: A GUIDE TO SALES & MARKETING 
COMPLIANCE 49, 49–51 (Mark Carlisle Levy ed., 4th ed. 2014) (discussing the distinction 
between marketing off-label uses and actually using drugs off-label in the context of FDA 
regulations). 
 
2017] THE TIP OF THE ICEBERG 1041 
one that is at least safe enough for broader testing (even if substantial safety 
risks remain).127 Patients often demand access to such unapproved drugs, still 
in the process of being tested.128 If there is a constitutional right to promote 
whatever is “safe” then it would arguably extend to this class of Notixas. Yet, 
allowing promotion at Phase II would of course eviscerate the very purpose of 
Phase III, which requires two well-controlled studies showing both safety and 
efficacy. Instead, the FDCA includes a “compassionate use” exception, which 
allows the FDA to grant access to these investigational drugs to certain patients, 
who have no other treatment options.129 The courts have held that, outside this 
system, there is no substantive due process right to access experimental drugs-
?essentially rejecting the right here asserted in the off-label context.130  
Beyond the drug domain, federal law requires that the FDA review color 
additives for safety before they can be added to food, drugs, or cosmetics.131 
Thus, on the challenger’s principle, could D&C Red #21 be promoted as a cure 
for cancer, diabetes, or acne because the FDA has approved it as safe for 
coloring drugs and cosmetics? Depending on how this theory is articulated, it 
may also apply to a wide range of foods, vitamins, and nutritional supplements 
that the FDA tolerates as presumably safe, although they are not subject to a 
premarket approval process. Can all these be touted as cures for cancer or hair 
loss?  
If the theory is that the federal government cannot reach promotions of 
products that are in fact safe (regardless of the FDA), then it would embrace 
even more Notixas, such as the rare mineral water promoted as a cure for colitis, 
or the Chinese herbal teas promoted as a cure for cancer.132  
                                                                                                                     
 127 See Michael J. Waring et al., An Analysis of the Attrition of Drug Candidates from 
Four Major Pharmaceutical Companies, 14 NATURE REVIEWS 475, 477 (2015) (showing 
that over a period of several years, of 145 drugs in Phase II trials, only 54 progressed to 
Phase III); id. at 479 (showing that about 25% of failures at Phase II are for safety, a rate 
similar to failures at Phase I). 
 128 Darrow et al., supra note 5, at 279. 
 129 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.200–.320 (2016). 
 130 See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 
F.3d 695, 703–07 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1159 (2008). But see 
Richard A. Epstein, The Erosion of Individual Autonomy in Medical Decisionmaking: Of the 
FDA and IRBs, 96 GEO. L.J. 559, 577 (2008) (“[A] good libertarian, like me, has no difficulty 
in sustaining the [substantive due process] constitutional challenge to the FDA’s authority 
[in Abigail Alliance].”). 
 131 21 U.S.C. § 379e (2012); see also id. § 321(t) (defining color additives). 
 132 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Sweep Stops Peddlers of Bogus Cancer 
Cures (Sept. 18, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/09/ftc-sweep-
stops-peddlers-bogus-cancer-cures [https://perma.cc/8SHL-8XR3] (discussing enforcement 
against a company peddling Chinese teas for cancer); Harriet Hall, The Water Cure: Another 
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Many Notixas are likely harmless, even if they are ineffectual and cause 
consumers to waste billions of dollars. One such (heavily litigated) example is 
saw palmetto, an herbal remedy, which has not received FDA approval as a 
treatment for mild benign prostatic hyperplasia.133 
The bottom line: if purported safety creates a right to promote off-label, the 
same theory would seem to apply to promotions of drugs and other products that 
have no FDA-approved labeling, but happen to have some evidence of safety. 
If valid, this principle undermines the premarket approval regime.  
D. The Litigation Alternative 
A fourth argument to support a right to promote off-label is to suggest that 
we do not need FDA regulation of off-label promotion because we have other 
legal mechanisms to protect against unsafe and fraudulent medical claims.134 In 
particular, the Federal Trade Commission can prosecute those who would make 
false or misleading claims.135 And since the federal government is a primary 
payor for health care, when it is defrauded by makers of drugs and devices it 
can also use the False Claims Act with the benefit of qui tam whistleblowers.136 
Individual patients can pursue products liability, false advertising, and fraud 
claims against manufacturers.137 Or, in theory, patients could even sue their 
doctors for negligently recommending such a product when doing so is outside 
the standard of care. In short, since we have all these forms of litigation that are 
utterly unproblematic for the First Amendment, we do not need this worrisome 
form of off-label regulation. 
Indeed, all of these mechanisms existed before the FDA was created to 
regulate safety and efficacy of the drugs through a premarket approval 
system.138 In 1937, a drug containing diethylene glycol killed 107 persons; the 
next year Congress enacted the FDCA, requiring that new drugs be proven safe 
before entering the market.139 In 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris 
                                                                                                                     
 133 See Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Stephen 
Bent et al., Saw Palmetto for Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 557, 557 
(2006) (no better than placebo). 
 134 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 11 (arguing that fraud litigation is an alternative 
to direct regulation of products).  
 135 See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 101, at 108 (arguing that prosecutions for false or 
misleading advertising are an alternative to misbranding prosecutions). 
 136 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)–3730(c) (2012).  
 137 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 558–59 (2009); Kaspar J. Stoffelmayr, 
Comment, Products Liability and “Off-Label” Uses of Prescription Drugs, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 275, 281 (1996). 
 138 See W. B. Rankin, The Future Relationships of FDA and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 20 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 632, 632 (1965). 
 139 See Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ 
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amendments, which required advance proof of minimal efficacy as well.140 
These laws were passed on the theory that backwards-looking enforcement and 
litigation were insufficient.141 In particular, in terms of when, who, and where, 
the FDCA departs from these other mechanisms in three primary ways: (a) 
safety and efficacy must be proven before marketing, (b) the manufacturers have 
the burden of making that proof, and (c) the proof must be evaluated by an expert 
agency, the FDA.142 In these other forms of litigation, the quality of the drug 
would not necessarily be investigated until the litigation commenced, and the 
plaintiff or prosecutor would bear the burden of proving, to the nonspecialist 
judge or jury, the negative—that the product is dangerous, ineffective, or both.  
One may debate whether each of these institutional features is optimally 
designed to promote innovation and protect the public health. We have already 
touched on the sensibility of putting the burden on the company that seeks to 
extract value from its own product (b) and why it is sensible to have an expert 
agency make that determination (c).143 From the First Amendment perspective 
in particular, one could object that requiring proof in advance of marketing (a) 
functions as a “prior restraint,” one of the most worrisome forms of regulation, 
squelching ideas before they are even aired.144 There is some debate about 
whether this doctrine is applicable in the commercial speech domain.145 Indeed, 
in the pivotal Central Hudson case concerning the advertising of utility services, 
the Court actually recommended such a pre-approval approach, building on a 
                                                                                                                     
ucm128305.htm [https://perma.cc/82CD-YBN7]. 
 140 Jeremy A. Greene & Scott H. Podolsky, Reform, Regulation, and Pharmaceuticals—
The Kefauver-Harris Amendments at 50, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1481, 1481 (2012). 
 141 See id. at 1481–82. 
 142 See id. 
 143 See supra Parts I–III.C.  
 144 See, e.g., Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First Amendment Constraints 
on FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 179 (2008) (arguing that “[t]raditional First Amendment 
doctrine erects a ‘heavy presumption’ against the validity of a prior restraint on 
noncommercial speech”); Kristie LaSalle, Note, A Prescription for Change: Citizens 
United’s Implications for Regulation of Off-Label Promotion of Prescription 
Pharmaceuticals, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 867, 893 (2011) (arguing that under the Court’s holding 
in Citizens United, the FDA’s ambiguous regulatory scheme functions as a prior restraint); 
Kyle Thomson, The Changing Landscape of the Commercial Speech Doctrine and FDA 
Advertising Regulation: Off-Label Marketing in the Wake of Sorrell v. IMS 26 (May 31, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2071226 [https://perma.cc/NTK4-
JR3E] (noting that it could be argued that the “FDA’s current practice is ‘amorphous’ in the 
way the Court in Citizens United defines it, and, as such, acts as a prior restraint on any 
potential promotional speech by a drug manufacturer”). 
 145 See Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 5 (2000) (arguing that “commercial speech doctrine does not prohibit . . . prior 
restraints”); id. at 32 (quoting Justice Blackmun in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy for the 
proposition). 
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precedent for prior review in the domain of obscenity law.146 Compared to 
utility company advertising or obscenity, the stakes are extremely high in the 
medical drug and device domain—life and death for sick patients who are 
sometimes so desperately ill that they are particularly vulnerable to irresponsible 
marketing. So, maybe this is the rare domain where a prior restraint on speech 
can survive constitutional scrutiny (assuming that it is a regulation of speech at 
all). 
Aside from the merits of this argument, all three of these elements (a, b, and 
c, enumerated above) apply equally in the domain of off-label and no-label 
prescribing. The same FDA review process and burden on the manufacturer 
applies to the first use of a drug and its tenth use. And we have the same 
regulatory alternatives—the Federal Trade Commission, a qui tam relator, or an 
injured patient can all go after no-label promoters or prescribers, just as they can 
off-label promoters and prescribers. If these avenues for litigation somehow 
undermined the FDA’s authority to regulate claims for Offixa, they would seem 
to do the same for Notixa. 
E. Paternalism 
A fifth argument asserted for the right to promote off-label says that the 
FDA is acting paternalistically, aiming to protect patients from making poor 
consumption decisions based on what they (or their physicians) hear in the 
promotions.147 Depending on one’s political theory, paternalism may or may 
not be a permissible basis for regulation generally, but many find that 
paternalism is inappropriate as a basis for speech regulation in particular.148 As 
David Strauss reads the doctrine, “the government may not justify a measure 
                                                                                                                     
 146 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 571 n.13 (“The Commission also might 
consider a system of previewing advertising campaigns to insure that they will not defeat 
conservation policy. It has instituted such a program for approving ‘informational’ 
advertising under the Policy Statement challenged in this case. We have observed that 
commercial speech is such a sturdy brand of expression that traditional prior restraint 
doctrine may not apply to it. And in other areas of speech regulation, such as obscenity, we 
have recognized that a prescreening arrangement can pass constitutional muster if it includes 
adequate procedural safeguards.” (citations omitted)). 
 147 See, e.g., Noah, supra note 106, at 31–32 (stating the paternalism objection); Thea 
Cohen, Note, The First Amendment and the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Marketing: 
Challenges to the Constitutionality of the FDA’s Interpretation of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1945, 1966–67 (2012) (stating the paternalism 
objection).  
 148 E.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (“First Amendment 
law . . . has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental 
motives. The doctrine comprises a series of tools to flush out illicit motives and to invalidate 
actions infected with them.”). 
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restricting speech by invoking harmful consequences that are caused by the 
persuasiveness of the speech.”149 
Of course, one need not concede that the FDA’s premarket approval system 
for intended uses of products is a speech regulation at all.150 But, assuming that 
it is a speech regulation, the premarket approval system is not necessarily 
paternalistic. A paternalist would claim to know what behaviors will be good or 
bad for a consumer and use a regulation to shape her consumption accordingly, 
but the FDA does not know whether any given product will be safe and effective 
for a given use. That ignorance is actually the whole point of the regulatory 
regime; it exists to produce knowledge.151 
The FDCA requires sellers of drugs to provide safety and efficacy evidence 
to support each intended use for the purpose of producing that knowledge for 
the consuming public.152 There is a large collective action problem; no 
individual patient or doctor would find it rational or feasible to do such scientific 
studies to determine safety and efficacy.153 Yet talk is cheap. Without a well-
powered controlled trial, like the ones required by Congress in the FDCA, it is 
impossible to reliably distinguish the drug’s effects from the natural course of 
the disease or sheer luck.154 The FDCA solves the collective action problem and 
creates a functioning market for quality drugs by putting the burden of scientific 
research on the company who seeks to exploit the economic value of those 
intended uses.155 It does so by prohibiting them from selling for intended uses 
that have not benefitted from such scientific investment.156 On this view, the 
                                                                                                                     
 149 David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 334, 334 (1991); see also Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 90, at 344 (“[S]uch 
paternalistic manipulation of consumer behavior is inconsistent with the very premises 
underlying democracy, let alone the constitutional guarantee of free expression, and no 
holding of the Court since at least the mid 1990s is inconsistent with this theory.”); Richard 
A. Samp, Courts Are Arriving at a Consensus on Food and Drug Administration Speech 
Regulation, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 313, 324 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has never accepted 
the notion that truthful speech can be regulated in order to prevent harm where the sole 
embodiment of that harm is the speech itself.”). 
 150 See supra Part III.A. 
 151 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 558–65 (discussing this epistemic and economic 
purpose for the FDA); Robertson & Laurion, supra note 32 (manuscript at 5–16) (developing 
the case study of Seroquel XR to show how the premarket approval system produces 
knowledge). 
 152 See Robertson, supra note 1, at 547. 
 153 See generally STIGLITZ, supra note 3. 
 154 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2016). 
 155 Cf., EPSTEIN, supra note 30, at 439 (noting resolution of a similar question where 
antitrust law sought to encourage competition “is wholly consistent with the First 
Amendment objective of pursuing competition in the marketplace of ideas”).  
 156 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(a)–(b)(1), 360e(c)(1). 
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regime is not paternalism; it is value creation. In this way, it is not unlike the 
system of patent law, which also proscribes sale to encourage innovation.157 
Here again, we need not resolve whether the FDA’s response to the 
paternalism argument is satisfactory. We need only observe that Offixa and 
Notixa rise together. The ban on no-label promotion (i.e., the entire premarket 
approval regime) is equally paternalistic?or not?as the ban on off-label 
promotion. In both cases, sellers are prohibited from marketing drugs that have 
not been proven safe and effective for their intended uses, and in both cases, 
patients also have physicians to protect their interests. Whether the FDCA’s 
regime is characterized as paternalistic or as solving a collective action problem 
to produce knowledge, the characterization would apply to both cases. 
F. Discrimination 
A sixth argument for a right to promote off-label says that the FDA 
discriminates between the seller of the drug and others, such as physicians or 
layperson authors, who may speak emphatically in favor of the unapproved 
use.158 In First Amendment doctrine, “viewpoint discrimination” is 
forbidden.159 However, it is sometimes difficult to tell when the predicate 
applies to a particular regulation.160 (Arguably, the rules on off-label promotion 
                                                                                                                     
 157 Patent law creates incentives for inventors to advance and disclose scientific 
knowledge by allowing only the inventor to reap the economic value of the product during 
the patent period. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 720 (2005) (“Patent protection on drugs typically begins and ends 
too early to permit firms to capture the full value of subsequently developed information 
about drug effects. It therefore does a better job of motivating the initial R&D that is 
necessary to bring new products to market than it does of motivating the development of new 
information about old drugs.”). 
 158 See Smolla, supra note 101, at 102 (similar); Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, 
Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA Off-Label Regulation Cannot Survive First 
Amendment Review Under Greater New Orleans, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 28–29 (2007) 
(raising the discrimination problem); Lise T. Spacapan & Jill M. Hutchison, Prosecutions of 
Pharmaceutical Companies for Off-Label Marketing: Fueled by Government’s Desire To 
Modify Corporate Conduct or Pursuit of a Lucrative Revenue Stream?, 22 ANNALS HEALTH 
L. 407, 420 (2013) (arrangement between manufacturers and physicians creates an 
asymmetric regulatory system); Jared Iraggi, Comment, The Future of Off-Label Marketing 
Regulations in the Post-Sorrell Era, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1137, 1157 (2013) (raising the 
discrimination problem).  
 159 See Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the 
Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 69 (2007) (stating that 
viewpoint discrimination is “the most universally condemned threat to the foundations of 
free expression”). 
 160 See Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial Speech, 41 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 169, 169 (2007) (“[T]he concept of ‘viewpoint discrimination’ is . . . confused and 
uncertain,” and “there are good, non-viewpoint-based reasons for extending to commercial 
speech forms of protection that differ from those extended to political speech.”). 
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are more of a speaker-discrimination than a viewpoint-discrimination, but in this 
context the manufacturer is likely to have a particularly positive view about its 
product, making the points converge.) 
Notably, the alleged discrimination created by the FDCA statute is not 
absolute. Companies may distribute reliable peer-reviewed publications about 
off-label uses and respond to questions from physicians without necessarily 
revealing an intent for the drug to be used off-label.161 These “safe harbors” for 
scientific communication about off-label uses arguably moot much of the 
concern that physician and patient are deprived of important information.162 But 
the safe harbors are narrow, and do not include puffery or emotive appeals that 
may be protected by the First Amendment.163 
Nonetheless, historically, the speech of drug manufacturers has been treated 
quite differently than the speech of doctors, patients, journalists, or academics. 
One could argue that the law properly disfavors the speech of the drug 
manufacturer, because it is likely biased towards consumption, and thus more 
likely to risk harm to consumers than the objective speech of disinterested third 
parties, like physicians.164 However, independent speech can be dangerous too 
“because listeners are less likely to be skeptical of recommendations made by 
objective observers.”165 As weak as it may be, this particular argument about 
bias and skepticism would seem to apply equally to Offixa and Notixa, since in 
either case a self-interested seller makes a claim to the safe and effective use of 
a product, which has not been approved by the FDA. 
Here again, the stronger argument is the formalist one. The law often 
imposes special duties to speak, or not speak, on those who create risks, such as 
product makers or landowners.166 Indeed, here the FDA reiterates that it is 
regulating the particular conduct of selling a drug, which explains why the 
speech of non-sellers is irrelevant—they are not undertaking the relevant 
                                                                                                                     
 161 See Good Reprint Practices for the Distribution of Medical Journal Articles and 
Medical or Scientific Reference Publications on Unapproved New Uses of Approved Drugs 
and Approved or Cleared Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2009), 
https://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125126.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VQ7MTPL4]; see also Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Food and 
Drug Administration Has the Legal Basis To Restrict Promotion of Flawed Comparative 
Effectiveness Research, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2200, 2201 (2012) (discussing some of these safe 
harbors). 
 162 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
765 (1976) (“[T]he free flow of commercial information is indispensable.”). 
 163 See Law, supra note 22, at 933 (arguing against an interpretation of the First 
Amendment that would exclude emotive noninformational advertising per se).  
 164 See REDISH, supra note 30, at 116 (discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health).  
 165 Id. 
 166 See, e.g., Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings, 198 P.3d 493, 504 (Wash. 2008) (limiting 
the duty to warn to the manufacturer’s own products).  
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conduct of introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce. Similarly, 
for illicit drugs, non-sellers can say all sorts of things about cocaine (“mmm, 
what a great high that would be”), without facing liability for transporting the 
drug in interstate commerce, as long as they do not undertake the latter behavior.  
An Offixa may be discovered by physicians, who begin using a drug’s side 
effect as a treatment, or who reason by analogy that a drug may be helpful in 
another domain where it is not FDA approved. Physicians face no liability for 
using a drug off-label,167 though a company will if it starts promoting the same 
use. Similarly, physicians can drive Notixa consumption. Physicians freely 
recommend the vitamin B6 to take along with a drug for tuberculosis, red yeast 
extract as a natural statin for cholesterol treatment, vitamin D for osteoporosis, 
bananas for renal tubular disorder, fiber for irritable bowel syndrome, sugar 
substitutes for diabetes, lactase supplements for digestive disorders, and prenatal 
vitamins to prevent neural tube disorders. Any of these could be no-label drugs 
if their makers expressed an intent to use them to treat a disease. The regime is 
quite parallel for both Offixa and Notixa.  
Overall, then, for either Offixa or Notixa, manufacturers commit a crime if 
they promote the product for cancer, and in both cases there will be others who 
make the same claims but face no criminal liability, because they do not ship 
the product in interstate commerce.168 If the First Amendment forbids this sort 
of “discrimination” between those who act and those who do not, it applies 
equally to Offixa or Notixa. 
G. The Alternative To Regulate Consumption Behavior 
Seventh, challengers argue that it is perfectly legal for a doctor to prescribe 
a drug off-label and a patient to consume it.169 Thus, unlike a speaker who 
proposes a crime like murder, the company’s encouragement of legal activity is 
protected by the First Amendment. A similar argument could be made in the 
Notixa domain: individuals may be perfectly free to take industrial bleach for 
their allergies (as in the case discussed in Part II above), but the sellers of those 
unapproved products commit a crime if they market them with an intent that 
they be so used. The fact that speech concerns a legal activity is necessary, but 
not sufficient, for it to be protected by the First Amendment.170 
                                                                                                                     
 167 See, e.g., Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that 
Medicaid must reimburse off-label uses of AZT drug). 
 168 See supra Part III.A. 
 169 See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 101, at 89 (suggesting that the FDA is encroaching on 
the regulation of the legally available drugs that doctors choose to prescribe). 
 170 See Law, supra note 22, at 942 (“Tobacco and alcohol manufacturers . . . argue that 
if a product is legal then any advertising promoting it is necessarily protected by the First 
Amendment. This claim, however, is . . . unsustainable.”). 
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A more interesting argument suggests that if the federal government is so 
concerned about off-label drug use, then it should directly regulate the 
consumption of drugs themselves, by regulating the behavior of physicians or 
patients rather than the speech of manufacturers.171 This argument fits into 
constitutional doctrine, which sees the regulation of speech as a last resort, 
allowed only when the regulation of behavior fails.172 The notion that a behavior 
regulation is possible shows that regulation of speech is inappropriate.173 
There is some irony to this argument, since the FDA maintains that it is 
regulating the conduct of selling a misbranded and unapproved drug in interstate 
commerce.174 And, there are cogent explanations for why Congress chose to 
regulate manufacturers, who are engaged in interstate commerce, rather than 
patients or doctors who are engaged in purely local activity.175 Aside from the 
values of federalism, manufacturers are in the best position to undertake the 
science that would prove the safety and efficacy of these uses and to recoup 
those costs if successful.176 Moreover, the plan created by Congress allows 
doctors and patients to experiment with unproven uses, even while maintaining 
an incentive for manufacturers to study them more systematically. Whether 
Congress could change the FDCA to regulate the practice of medicine directly 
is an interesting question, far beyond the present inquiry. 
It is not particularly clear how this supposed alternative mechanism of 
conduct-based regulation would work, since the regulator must still discern 
whether a given product is being sold, prescribed, or consumed for an 
unapproved use versus an approved use. Could a regulator extract the 
                                                                                                                     
 171 See, e.g., Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 30, at 360 (“The principal implication 
of info-libertarianism is that it prefers direct regulation of conduct to achieve regulatory goals 
over indirect regulation of information.”); Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 90, at 343 (“[I]f 
the FDA were truly concerned with the manufacturer’s non-expressive act of sale with intent 
that the product be used off-label, it would logically prohibit all sales of a drug widely used 
off-label.”); Noah, supra note 106, at 32 (arguing that direct controls over off-label drug use 
do not raise free speech obstacles). 
 172 Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 30, at 360–61. 
 173 The Supreme Court has sometimes turned this argument on its head. See, e.g., 
Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (stating that it 
would “surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to the legislature 
the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legislature the authority to 
forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity through advertising”); see also 
Law, supra note 22, at 938 (calling it “flatly inconsistent with a settled body of First 
Amendment jurisprudence” for a state to be able to “suppress speech advocating conduct 
that it could prohibit”); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the 
First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1182 (1988) (proposing that Posadas is 
irreconcilable with Virginia Citizens Consumer Council and Central Hudson). 
 174 See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text and discussion supra Part III.A. 
 175 See David Orentlicher, Off-Label Drug Marketing, the First Amendment, and 
Federalism, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 89, 98–101 (2016). 
 176 See discussion supra Part III.E. 
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physician’s intended use for a product from his notes in the patient’s electronic 
medical records?177 That data is a form of speech too.178 If the regulation targets 
the doctor’s recommending or prescribing of the drug, it would seem to be an 
even more direct regulation of speech.  
Supposing that there is some nonspeech way to regulate off-label use, and 
that counts as a critique of the status quo, this seventh point would seem to apply 
equally to drugs that have received no FDA approvals (Notixa). An alternative 
regulatory system could allow unapproved drugs to be advertised and shipped 
in interstate commerce (as they were prior to FDCA being enacted), but then 
prohibit doctors from recommending them or patients from consuming them. 
Patients would have less liberty to try drugs than they do now and there would 
be more federal interference in local behavior. And, without a solution to the 
collective action problem, we would likely have much less science produced 
and thus less real information about safety and efficacy. As irrational as the 
alternative nonspeech regulation of no-label drug use may be, it may also be 
conceptually possible, just as much as the nonspeech regulation of off-label use 
may be conceptually possible. 
Thus the regulation of Offixas and Notixas rise and fall together on this final 
argument. This criterion does not cut between them.  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis here shows that the challenges to the FDA in the off-label 
domain are actually more profound than they appear. If these arguments rest on 
valid premises, the same premises would threaten the entire FDA premarket 
approval regime. Indeed, the companion article shows that virtually every area 
of federal law has an intent-based test, not unlike the one in the FDCA.179 And, 
                                                                                                                     
 177 See Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for 
Regulating Off-Label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DUKE L.J. 377, 380–81 (2014) (arguing 
for use of prescribing data by FDA); Andrew English et al., A New Regulatory Function for 
E-Prescriptions: Linking FDA to Physicians and Patient Records, in FDA IN THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 486, 
486 (Holly Fernandez Lynch & I. Glenn Cohen eds., 2015) (arguing for such use more 
generally to “serve FDA regulatory objectives in overseeing the postmarket [sic] safety and 
efficacy of medical products”); Marc A. Rodwin, Rooting Out Institutional Corruption To 
Manage Inappropriate Off-Label Drug Use, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 654, 659 (2013) (arguing 
for use of prescribing data by FDA); Benjamin N. Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses 
63 (Oct. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2337821 
[https://perma.cc/92TK-3BFB] (proposing use of electronic medical records in this way). 
 178 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011) (“[T]he creation and 
dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.”); Jane 
Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57 (2014) (answering her question in the 
affirmative). 
 179 See generally Robertson & Laurion, supra note 32. 
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in case after case, the courts are routinely using speech as evidence of the 
relevant intent.180  
So what? One could assert a slippery slope argument in a consequentialist 
sense: that judicial recognition of a right to off-label promotion will inevitably 
lead courts to also someday strike down the FDA’s entire premarket approval 
regime and perhaps many other federal laws with a similar intent-based 
structure. That prognostication may be true given the way precedent works, and 
many may adjust that outcome horrible. Yet, such a consequentialist argument 
would require additional premises about judicial behavior, not offered here.181 
To the contrary, courts can and do draw arbitrary lines, and the Supreme Court 
can and does simply refuse to take cases that would undermine an arbitrary but 
workable status quo.182  
The point is instead about principle. The current debate over off-label 
promotion is implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, a debate about competing 
theories of the First Amendment.183 However, it is rare for such theories to be 
comprehensively articulated or evaluated as such; instead, we only see glimpses 
through inevitably ambiguous rhetoric and argued (favorable) applications to 
specific cases. But how are we to evaluate whether the premises themselves are 
reasonable? How can we evaluate if a given First Amendment theory is 
legitimate? 
As Richard Fallon and Mitchell Berman have argued—drawing from the 
philosophical approach of John Rawls and the pragmatists—the analytic 
crucible is a reflective equilibrium with our other judgments.184 If a theory of 
                                                                                                                     
 180 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
 181 See Eugene Volokh, Slippery Slope Arguments, in 8 THE INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 4923, 4924 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2013) (“[O]verstated slippery 
slope arguments, which claim that ‘Adopting proposed decision A will necessarily lead to 
the adoption of decision B,’ are generally fallacious. . . . To be valid, . . . [t]he argument 
would have to assert that, though a line between A and B could be drawn, for political, 
economic, or psychological reasons it may end up not being drawn.”). See generally 
DOUGLAS WALTON, SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS (1992) (arguing that some forms of 
slippery slope arguments are valid).  
 182 See Toni M. Massaro, Constitutional Law as “Normal Science,” 21 CONST. 
COMMENT. 547, 548 (2004) (“Simulating the common law process of decision-making, the 
Justices invoke available doctrinal support for shifts. They seek to cabin the impact of any 
changes, and they emphasize the limited role that the Court realistically can, and 
constitutionally should, play in shaping public policy.”). 
 183 See, e.g., Klasmeier & Redish, supra note 90, at 350–51 (describing “four core 
postulates” of the First Amendment).  
 184 See Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons 
from John McCain and the Natural-Born Citizenship Clause, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 246, 247 (Grant Huscroft & 
Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Arguing in Good Faith About the 
Constitution: Ideology, Methodology, and Reflective Equilibrium, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 
123–24 (2017). 
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the First Amendment necessary to support a right to off-label promotion also 
creates a right for fraudsters to bring drugs to market without FDA approval at 
all (and jeopardizes large swaths of federal law, as we show in the companion 
piece), then our views about these applications can shed light back on the theory 
itself. If my argument is valid, there does not seem to be a basis for off-label 
exceptionalism. One must either accept a right to no-label drug promotion or 
reject a right for off-label drug promotion.185 Concededly, the present negative 
form of the argument cannot say which is the more bitter pill. Even for strong 
libertarians, however, such an implication may give pause.186 This Article 
shows how high the stakes may be for the project of using the Constitution to 
dismantle the modern regulatory state. 
                                                                                                                     
 185 In formal logic, the relationship is modus tolens. In informal logic, the argument is 
known as a reductio ad absurdum. See generally Candice Shelby, Reductio Ad Absurdum 
and Slippery Slope Arguments: Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 1 ANNALES PHILOSOPHICI 77, 
79–80 (2010) (showing that the reductio is valid even while the slippery slope argument 
often is not). 
 186 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 4, at 20 (“For the moment, at least, I would leave in 
place the requirement that a drug pass Phase I trials.”). 
